What’s Next for the Second Blocked Travel Ban?

Judges in Hawaii and Maryland recently prevented parts of the second executive order on refugees from going into effect temporarily, citing likely violations of the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause.

President Trump’s second travel ban prohibits refugees and other visitors from predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States. (Getty Images)

On March 16, 2017, President Donald Trump’s second travel ban executive order was scheduled to be enacted. Within hours of each other, federal judges from Hawaii and Maryland issued decisions temporarily preventing portions of it from going into effect nationwide. Both decisions conclude that the executive order likely violates the Establishment Clause because it was intended to prevent people from for entering the United States on the basis of religion.

The State of Hawaii (and an American citizen of Egyptian descent with a Syrian mother-in-law lacking a visa) brought the case decided by the court in Hawaii.

The president’s first executive order prevented people from seven predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days. The Ninth Circuit temporarily struck it down, concluding it likely violated the due process rights of lawful permanent residents, non-immigrant visa holders, and refugees.

The second executive order prevents people from six predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days, but only applies to new visa applicants and allows for case-by-case waivers.

The Establishment Clause prevents the government from preferring one religion over another. To that end, laws must have a secular purpose.

The Hawaii judge reasoned that “a reasonable, objective observer enlightened by the specific historical context, contemporaneous public statements, and specific sequences of events leading to its issuance” would conclude the executive order was intended to disfavor Muslims despite its “stated, religiously-neutral purpose.” More specifically, the court relied on numerous statements made by the president himself indicating he wanted a “Muslim ban.”

The Maryland judge’s analysis of the purpose of the travel ban is very similar to that of the Hawaii judge, but the Maryland judge spends more time dismissing the notion that national security concerns were the real reason for the travel ban. “The fact that the White House took the highly irregular step of first introducing the travel ban without receiving the input and judgment of the relevant national security agencies strongly suggests that the religious purpose was primary, and the national security purpose, even if legitimate, is a secondary post hoc rationale.”

President Trump has three options at this point. First, he can appeal both rulings to the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, respectively, like he did when a federal district court judge in the state of Washington struck down the first travel ban. Three-judge panels will decide whether to affirm the lower court decisions. Second, he can go back to the drawing board again and issue a third travel ban. Finally, he can abandon altogether the adoption of a travel ban.

Initial comments made by the president indicate he would like to take this travel ban (as well as the first one) all the way to the Supreme Court.

On March 15, 2017, the full Ninth Circuit issued an opinion stating that it would not rehear the case regarding the first travel ban. Interestingly, five Ninth Circuit judges dissented from this decision, concluding that the first travel ban was “well within the powers of the presidency.”

If the president appeals the Hawaii ruling to the Ninth Circuit, it is possible that the three-judge panel could include between zero and three of these dissenting judges.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC), which files Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Big Seven national organizations representing state and local governments. She is a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.

Supreme Court Will Not Decide Transgender Bathroom Case

The case revolves around the interpretation of a federal regulation that bans discrimination “on the basis of sex” in schools that receive federal money. The legal question is whether it can also ban discrimination based on gender identity.

The Trump Administration’s reversal of a rule on transgender students’ rights has effectively removed the case from the Court’s docket. (Getty Images)

The Supreme Court will not decide – at least not this term – whether transgender students have a right to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity, due to changes in position on this issue from the Obama Administration to the Trump Administration.

Title IX prohibits school districts that receive federal funds from discriminating “on the basis of sex.” A Title IX regulation states that, if school districts maintain separate bathrooms (locker rooms, showers, etc.) “on the basis of sex,” they must provide comparable facilities for the other sex.

In a 2015 letter, the Department of Education (DOE) interpreted the Title IX regulation to mean that, if schools provide for separate boys’ and girls’ bathrooms, transgender students must be allowed to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity. DOE and the Department of Justice reaffirmed this stance in a May 2016 “Dear Colleague” letter.

On February 22, 2017, DOE issued a “Dear Colleague” letter withdrawing the previous letters. The new “Dear Colleague” letter takes no position on whether the term “sex” in Title IX includes gender identity.

G.G. is transgender. The Gloucester County School Board prevented him from using the boy’s bathroom. He sued the district arguing that is discriminated against him in violation of Title IX.

In November 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to decide two questions in Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. First, should it defer to DOE’s letter interpreting the regulation? Second, putting the letter aside, should the Title IX regulation be interpreted as DOE suggests?

The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of G.G. The court gave Auer deference to DOE’s letter. Per Auer v. Robbins (1997), a court generally must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its ambiguous regulations. According to the Fourth Circuit, the Title IX regulation is ambiguous because it is “susceptible to more than one plausible reading because it permits both the Board’s reading (determining maleness or femaleness with reference exclusively to genitalia) and the Department’s interpretation (determining maleness or femaleness with reference to gender identity).”

Despite the 2015 and 2016 letters being rescinded, both parties still wanted the Supreme Court to decide this case. As the parties pointed out, the second question – how to interpret the Title IX regulations regardless of DOE’s position – doesn’t depend on the views of either administration.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has sent this case back to the Fourth Circuit to rehear it in light of the new “Dear Colleague” letter. That ruling may again to appealed to the Supreme Court.

It seems likely that sooner rather than later, and probably with the benefit of nine Justices, the Supreme Court will again be considering the question of the rights of transgender students.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC), which files Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Big Seven national organizations representing state and local governments. She is a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.

The Trump Administration and Waters of the U.S.

President Donald Trump recently signed an executive order aimed at rolling back the Waters of the U.S. (WOTUS) rule, an Obama-era rule designed to protect the streams and wetlands that form the foundation of the nation’s water resources. What will happen to current WOTUS litigation following the president’s recent executive order?

(Getty Images)

Per the Clean Water Act, “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) are parcels of land, such as the wetlands pictured above, which are federally regulated by the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers. (Getty Images)

President Donald Trump’s executive order Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the “Waters of the United States” Rule calls for the “rescinding or revising” of the Waters of the United States (WOTUS) definitional rule published in the summer of 2015. Many state and local governments objected to the broad nature of these regulations, in particular to the expansive definition of ditches and the ambiguous definition of tributaries.

“The EPA so-called Waters of the United States rule is one of the worst examples of federal regulation, and it has truly run amok, and is one of the rules most strongly opposed by farmers, ranchers and agricultural workers all across our land,” said President Trump on Tuesday.

The executive order acknowledges that rewriting the WOTUS definitional regulations will require going through the lengthy and complicated process under the Administrative Procedures Act which the 2015 final regulations endured. This process involves proposing a new rule, receiving and responding to (likely thousands) of comments, and issuing a final rule.

The current WOTUS regulations are subject to complicated litigation. In October 2015, the Sixth Circuit issued a temporary stay of the regulations preventing them from going into effect nationally. In February 2016, the Sixth Circuit ruled that it, rather than a federal district court, has jurisdiction to rule on whether the WOTUS rule exceeded the Clean Water Act.

In January 2017 the Supreme Court agreed to review the Sixth Circuit ruling that an appellate court – not a district court – has jurisdiction to rule on WOTUS. This case, National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, will not be heard until late 2017, meaning the Supreme Court may not issue an opinion in this case until as late as June 2018.

What will be the fate of all this WOTUS litigation over the current rule in light of the executive order? We don’t know – but the executive order directs the Attorney General to “inform any court of such review and take such measures as he deems appropriate concerning any such litigation pending the completion of further administrative proceedings related to the rule.”

The Attorney General may ask the Sixth Circuit to voluntarily vacate its decision temporarily staying the regulations, given that the new administration intends to change them. The Sixth Circuit is more likely to agree to this if none of the parties object. A number of states and environmental groups have intervened in support of the current WOTUS regulations and may object.

If the Sixth Circuit vacates the stay, the practical effect is that the current regulations would no longer be valid. Vacatur of the Sixth Circuit stay also would likely render moot the Supreme Court challenge on jurisdiction. If the Sixth Circuit refuses (or isn’t asked) to vacate the Sixth Circuit decision regarding the stay, the Supreme Court jurisdiction litigation is likely to proceed indefinitely.

Given that defining WOTUS has been so difficult and contentious, almost no matter what new definition is proposed it too will be subject to litigation.

The executive order instructs that Justice Antonin Scalia’s decision in Rapanos v. United States be “considered” in defining the term “navigable waters.” Rapanos is a 4-1-4 decision. Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, defining this term more narrowly than Justice Kennedy’s solo concurring opinion. The Sixth Circuit considered Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion controlling. If the new definition of WOTUS relies on Justice Scalia’s opinion, it will almost certainly be challenged on this ground, along with many others.

Interested in more WOTUS news? Lisa Soronen contributed a previous CitiesSpeak blog post about the jurisdictional determinations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC), which files Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Big Seven national organizations representing state and local governments. She is a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.

What’s Next for the Supreme Court’s Transgender Bathroom Case?

The case revolves around the interpretation of a federal regulation that bans discrimination “on the basis of sex” in schools that receive federal money. The legal question is whether it can also ban discrimination based on gender identity.

hear oral argument in the case next month, if not before. (Getty Images)

Although the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in the case next month, if not before, the Trump administration’s reversal of a rule on transgender students’ rights could potentially remove the case from the Court’s docket. (Getty Images)

The fate of the most controversial case the Supreme Court has agreed to decide this term is uncertain now that the Department of Education (DOE) has issued a “Dear Colleague” letter withdrawing a previous letter requiring school districts to allow transgender students to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity.

Title IX prohibits school districts that receive federal funds from discriminating “on the basis of sex.” A Title IX regulation states that, if school districts maintain separate bathrooms (locker rooms, showers, etc.) “on the basis of sex,” they must provide comparable facilities for the other sex. In a 2015 letter DOE interpreted the Title IX regulation to mean that, if schools provide for separate boys’ and girls’ bathrooms, transgender students must be allowed to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity. The new “Dear Colleague” letter takes no position on whether the term “sex” in Title IX includes gender identity.

The Supreme Court has agreed to decide two questions in Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.  First, should it defer to DOE’s letter interpreting the regulation? Second, putting the letter aside, should the Title IX regulation be interpreted as DOE suggests?

G.G. is biologically female but identifies as a male. The Gloucester County School Board prevented him from using the boy’s bathroom. He sued the district, arguing that it discriminated against him in violation of Title IX. The Fourth Circuit Court ruled in favor of G.G, giving Auer deference to DOE’s letter.

Per Auer v. Robbins (1997), a court generally must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its ambiguous regulations. According to the Fourth Circuit, the Title IX regulation is ambiguous because it is “susceptible to more than one plausible reading because it permits both the Board’s reading (determining maleness or femaleness with reference exclusively to genitalia) and the Department’s interpretation (determining maleness or femaleness with reference to gender identity).”

Despite the 2015 letter being rescinded, both parties still want the Supreme Court to decide this case. On SCOTUSblog, Amy Howe describes some of the Court’s options: “Among other things, they could send the case back to the Fourth Circuit for it to weigh in more fully on the Title IX question in light of the government’s changed position, or they could forge ahead and rule on that question themselves. At the very least, we should know more about the justices’ inclinations when they hear oral arguments in the case next month, if not before.”

Putting aside the factual context of this case, state and local governments, acting through the State and Local Legal Center, have criticized Auer deference in Supreme Court amicus briefs. The Gloucester County School Board asked the Supreme Court to decide whether to overturn Auer, but the Court refused to consider this question.

Two states – Tennessee and Arkansas – have passed laws that preempt local non-discrimination provisions.

“Preemption efforts – where state law nullifies a municipal ordinance or authority – lead to a loss of local control and can have far-reaching economic and social impacts in our communities,” said National League of Cities (NLC) CEO and Executive Director Clarence E. Anthony. NLC’s latest report, City Rights in an Era of Preemption, examines the prevalence of state preemption across the country.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC), which files Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Big Seven national organizations representing state and local governments. She is a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.

Supreme Court Midterm Review for Local Governments 2017

The Supreme Court’s 2016-2017 docket is now set – and a number of cases will directly impact local governments.

photo - Supreme Court in Spring with Fountain

The Court may decide to rehear tied (4-4) cases next term, when a new Justice will presumably join the bench. (Getty Images)

This article covers cases of interest to local governments which the Court accepted after September 15, 2016 and agreed to hear this term. (Here is a summary of cases of interest to local governments which the Court agreed to hear before September 15, 2016.) The Court is still down a Justice, but has accepted as many cases as usual (about 75) on its 2016-2017 docket. In theory, all the cases discussed below will be decided by June 30, 2017.

The Supreme Court’s decision from this term most likely to receive significant media attention involves a transgender student who wants to use the bathroom consistent with his gender identity. However, Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. will not directly affect local governments.

Provocation

In Los Angeles County v. Mendez,* the Supreme Court must decide whether to accept or reject the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation” rule. Per this rule, “where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation, he may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force.”

It is undisputed that police officers used reasonable force when they shot Angel Mendez. As officers entered, unannounced, the shack where Mendez was living they saw a silhouette of Mendez pointing what looked like a rifle at them. Yet the Ninth Circuit awarded him and his wife damages because the officers didn’t have a warrant to search the shack, thereby “provoking” Mendez.

The Mendezes also argue that, putting the provocation theory aside, the officers are liable in this case because their unconstitutional entry “proximately caused” them to shoot Mendez. Many Americans own guns, so the Court argued it is reasonably foreseeable that, if officers barge into a shack unannounced, the person in the shack may be holding a gun.

Qualified Immunity

United States Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr., shot and killed Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, who was standing on the Mexico side of the U.S.-Mexico border. At the time of the shooting, Agent Mesa didn’t know that Hernandez was a Mexican citizen.

One question in Mesa v. Hernandez is whether qualified immunity may be granted or denied based on facts unknown to the officer at the time of the incident, such as the victim’s legal status. The Fifth Circuit granted Agent Mesa qualified immunity based on the fact that Hernandez was a Mexican citizen even though Agent Mesa didn’t know that at the time of the shooting.

Given the rapid pace of police work, it is not unusual for officers to learn a variety of information after they have used force, which supports their qualified immunity claim (i.e. the person they shot had a gun, had threatened another officer or citizen, etc.). Considering this kind of after-the-fact information in the qualified immunity analysis would be favorable to officers.

But the question in this case is whether qualified immunity may be granted or denied based on facts discovered later. In some cases, officers may learn after-the-fact information that undermines their claim for qualified immunity (i.e. the person they shot stated he had a weapon but did not, had been mistakenly perceived to have threatened another officer or citizen, etc.). Considering this kind of after-the-fact information in the qualified immunity analysis would be unfavorable to officers.

Free Speech

During the fall, the Supreme Court accepted three First Amendment free speech cases. This is not good news for local governments, as the Supreme Court routinely and sometimes unanimously votes against states and local governments in First Amendment free speech cases.

Packingham v. North Carolina* is probably the First Amendment case of most interest to local governments as the Supreme Court is likely to discuss whether the statute at issue in the case is content-based or content-neutral.

The issue in this case is whether a North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing commercial social networking websites, where the registered sex offender knows minors can create or maintain a profile, violates the First Amendment.

Lester Packingham was charged with violating the North Carolina statute because he accessed Facebook. In the posting that got him in trouble, Packingham thanked God for the dismissal of a ticket.

If a statute limits speech based on content, it is subject to strict (nearly always fatal) scrutiny. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona (2015), the Supreme Court held that the definition of content-based is very broad.

The North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the statute is a “content-neutral” regulation because it “imposed a ban on accessing certain defined commercial social networking websites without regard to any content or message conveyed on those sites.”

Waters of the U.S.

The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether federal courts of appeals versus federal district courts have the authority to rule whether the “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) regulations are lawful in National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense.

Per the Clean Water Act, a number of decisions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator must be heard directly in federal courts of appeals, including agency actions “in issuing or denying any permit.”

A definitional regulation like the WOTUS regulation does not involve the issuing or denying of a permit. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it has jurisdiction to decide whether the WOTUS regulations are lawful.

Judge McKeague, writing for the court, relied on a 2009 Sixth Circuit decision National Cotton Council v. EPA, holding that this provision encompasses “not only… actions issuing or denying particular permits, but also… regulations governing the issuance of permits.” The definition of WOTUS impacts permitting requirements.

…and more

The work of the Supreme Court never ends. The Court has already accepted one case for next term involving a local government. In District of Columbia v. Wesby, the Supreme Court will decide whether, when the owner of a vacant house informs police he has not authorized entry, an officer assessing probable cause to arrest those inside for trespassing may discredit the suspects’ claims of an innocent mental state.

*Indicates a case where the SLLC has filed or will file an amicus brief.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC), which files Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Big Seven national organizations representing state and local governments. She is a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.

What’s Next for President Trump’s Travel Ban

The executive order on refugees has had a significant impact on America’s cities – but it could also be an indicator of how the president’s executive orders will generally be interpreted throughout the legal system moving forward.

(Getty Images)

Litigation will likely continue regarding President Trump’s travel ban, which prohibits refugees and other visitors from predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States. (Getty Images)

On February 9, the Ninth Circuit Court refused to stay a district court’s temporary restraining order disallowing President Donald Trump’s travel ban from going into effect. The executive order prevents people from seven predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days.

The states of Washington and Minnesota sued President Trump, claiming their public universities are harmed because students and faculty of the affected countries cannot travel for research, academic collaboration, or personal reasons. A wide swath of people are affected by this executive order, including refugees, legal residents, and visa holders who may have different rights and legal claims based on their status.

The government argued that the president has “unreviewable authority to suspend admissions of any class of aliens.” The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating “there is no precedent to support this claimed unreviewablity, which runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy.”

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the states are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the executive order violates the due process rights of lawful permanent residents, non-immigrant visa holders, and refugees. More specifically, the executive order provides no notice and hearing before restricting a person’s right to travel and “contravenes the procedures provided by federal statute for refugees seeking asylum.”

Technically speaking, no court has yet ruled on the merits of this case – instead, the courts have only temporarily prevented the executive order from going into effect based on their view that the government is likely to ultimately lose. The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to stop a likely unlawful activity until a full briefing can occur to determine if unlawful activity is in fact occurring.

In response to the temporary restraining order, the president Tweeted, “SEE YOU IN COURT.” We have every reason to believe the litigation in this case will continue, so what are the president’s options?

A run-of-the-mill case would now go back to the district court where the legal issues would be fully briefed. The district court would then issue an opinion determining definitively whether the executive order is unconstitutional. That ruling could then be appealed back to the Ninth Circuit and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court. However, President Trump has two other options.

First, he can ask the U.S. Supreme Court to stay the district court’s temporary restraining order while the case is being fully briefed at the district court. This request would go to Justice Anthony Kennedy, who oversees emergency appeals from the Ninth Circuit. Justice Kennedy could rule on this issue alone or ask the entire Court to rule (which is probably more likely). Five votes from the current eight Justices would be needed to temporarily reinstate the ban. As Amy Howe of SCOTUSblog notes, “if the government can’t get those votes – which could be difficult, given the temporary and relatively narrow nature of the court’s ruling – the ban could remain on hold while its full merits are litigated in the lower courts.”

Second, instead of going directly to the Supreme Court, President Trump could ask the entire Ninth Circuit to stay the district court’s temporary restraining order while the case is being briefed at the district court.

Two other technical points about this case that could affect whether and how it is litigated are noteworthy. First, the travel ban only lasts for 90 days, so at some point very soon the litigation in this case could be moot unless the president extends the travel ban. Second, President Trump could modify the executive order to cure the due process problems the Ninth Circuit pointed out. However, this might not be enough. Washington and Minnesota raised numerous claims in addition to due process which the Ninth Circuit did not rule on for the sake of expediency. However, the Ninth Circuit went out of its way to describe, but not rule on, the states’ religious discrimination claim – which at the very least implies that the court thought this claim might be valid as well.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center and a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.

Is President Trump’s “2-for-1” Executive Order Actionable?

Without a doubt, state and local governments would benefit from the repeal of many federal regulations – but there are legal barriers to the president’s approach.

President Donald Trump signs an executive order to advance the construction of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines. (Wikimedia Commons)

President Trump signs an executive order to advance the construction of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines. (Wikimedia Commons)

Through executive orders, presidents are able to direct the work of administrative agencies and implement authority granted to their office by a federal statute or the U.S. Constitution. President Donald Trump’s “2-for-1” executive order – which states that, for every federal regulation proposed, two must be “identified” for repeal – has, unsurprisingly, been criticized by some and applauded by others. Per the executive order, for every regulation added, the cost of the new regulation must be offset by eliminating two regulations.

Those who are for the executive order argue it will be good for the economy. Those who are against it argue most regulations exist for good reason and eliminating regulations like “limiting lead in drinking water and cutting pollution from school buses” will harm Americans. Those opposing the executive order also argue it is arbitrary to eliminate regulations based solely on cost without considering benefit.

Without a doubt, state and local governments would benefit from the repeal of many federal regulations. But can it be done this way? At least two legal barriers exist to eliminating regulations, either through a “2-for-1” scheme or in general.

Some statutes require administrative agencies to write regulations. Simply eliminating such regulations would be legally problematic. The executive order is sprinkled with the phrase “unless required by law,” which is perhaps an acknowledgement that not all regulations can be eliminated without a replacement.

Per the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), getting rid of federal regulations involves the same lengthy and cumbersome process as adopting federal regulations. The agency must publish the proposed repeal in the Federal Register, solicit comments from interested parties, and read and respond to comments. This process would likely take more than a year, and much longer for more complicated or controversial regulations.

The APA requires that repeals of rules not be arbitrary or capricious. Per this standard, an agency must “display awareness that it is changing position” and “show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” Eliminating regulations for the sake of meeting a numerical or cost-based quota is not likely to satisfy this standard.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center and a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.

What Might Justice Gorsuch Mean for State and Local Governments?

One case in particular gives cities a reason to be excited about this nomination.

President Donald Trump with Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch at the White House. (Wikimedia Commons)

President Donald Trump with Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch at the White House. (Wikimedia Commons)

The authors of Searching for Scalia evaluated who on President Donald Trump’s list of potential nominees to replace Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat on the Supreme Court would be most like Justice Scalia – the originalist, the textualist, and, most importantly, the conservative. The winner: Supreme Court nominee Judge Neil Gorsuch.

While just one case is too few to judge any Supreme Court nominee, one case in particular gives state and local governments a reason to be excited about this nomination. Last year, Judge Gorsuch (strongly) implied that, given the opportunity, the U.S. Supreme Court should overrule Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (1992). In Quill, the Supreme Court held that states cannot require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax.

While Judge Gorsuch hasn’t ruled on abortion (an issue states care about), his most prominent rulings involve a related issue (the Affordable Care Act birth control mandate), which is not of particular interest to state and local governments.

Interestingly, in the one area of the law where the views of Judge Gorsuch and Justice Scalia differ – agency deference – the views of state and local governments are generally more in-line with Judge Gorsuch’s view. Less than six months ago, Judge Gorsuch called for the end of Chevron deference. In Chevron v. NRDC (1984), the Supreme Court held that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. State and local governments generally prefer that courts not defer to federal agency regulations because this deference gives federal agencies a lot of power.

If Judge Gorsuch is confirmed, his views on agency deference could be very important if the Court rules on the legality of the Clean Power Plan, the Waters of the United States definitional regulations, and the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime rules.

Like Justice Scalia, Judge Gorsuch has written a number of opinions indicating he is supportive of religion in public spaces. His opinions don’t indicate that he objects to the death penalty. While he hasn’t decided any cases involving gun control, he encouraged the Tenth Circuit to review a case where it held that, to convict a felon for knowingly possessing a gun, the person convicted doesn’t have to know he or she is a felon.

Liberals, and conservatives especially, routinely rule against state and local governments in First Amendment cases. Judge Gorsuch’s First Amendment opinions indicate he may be no exception.

Justice Scalia was known to take a more pro-privacy, pro-criminal defendant view of the Fourth Amendment than his conservative colleagues on the Supreme Court. Many of Judge Gorsuch’s more prominent rulings involve the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Carloss demonstrates that Judge Gorsuch may have Fourth Amendment instincts similar to Justice Scalia. In this case, Carloss posted a “no trespassing” sign. In his dissent, Judge Gorsuch opined that the sign revoked a police officer’s license to enter the property.

Not much has been written about Judge Gorsuch’s views on some of the more routine cases brought against state and local governments, including employment, qualified immunity and land use. It would be surprising if Judge Gorsuch veered to the left on any of these issues.

Now that we know who the nominee is, two questions remain: Will the Senate Democrats filibuster Judge Gorsuch, as they have promised to do? And if they do, will Senate Republicans exercise the “nuclear option,” meaning only a simple majority of Senators will be needed to confirm Judge Gorsuch’s nomination? Time will tell.

SCOTUSblog provides a more in-depth analysis of Judge Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit opinions.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center and a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.

Refugee Executive Order Faces Legal Challenges

Judges in New York and Boston, among other cities, have prevented parts of the executive order on refugees from going into effect temporarily, citing possible violations of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.

(Wikimedia Commons)

Protestors have gathered at airports across the country, such as the Metropolitan Airport in Detroit (above), to protest President Trump’s executive order barring refugees and other visitors from predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States. (Wikimedia Commons)

President Donald Trump’s refugee executive order has resulted in confusion and lawsuits which will continue to be resolved in the upcoming months. On Monday night, acting Attorney General Sally Yates directed Justice Department attorneys not to defend the executive order in court. President Trump quickly fired her. Dana Boente was promptly sworn in, and has instructed DOJ lawyers to “defend the lawful orders of our president.”

Cities preparing to receive Syrian refugees and others are having to change plans. Additionally, cities have been affected by protests, airports have been overrun, and 16 attorneys general have spoken out against the executive order.

While not all aspects of the executive order are entirely clear, it includes the following:

  1. People from the following countries may not enter the United States for the next 90 days: Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen
  2. Syrian refugees are banned from the United States indefinitely
  3. No refugees will be allowed into the United States for the next 120 days
  4. Only 50,000 (versus 110,000 last year) refugees will be allowed in the United States in 2017
  5. Refugees with religious-based persecution claims will be prioritized where they are of a minority religion in their country of origin

Judges in New York, Boston, Virginia, and Seattle have issued temporary injunctions against various aspects of this executive order, citing a variety of legal grounds.

A wide swath of people will be affected by this executive order, including refugees, legal residents, and visa holders who may have different rights and legal claims based on their status. Adding to the complexity, the Immigration and Nationality Act appears contradictory. It gives the president of the United States broad power to ban classes of people for periods of time “as he shall deem necessary” – yet it also states that “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”

Numerous legal theories have been relied on and are being discussed as grounds for challenging this executive order.

Judges in New York and Boston prevented parts of the executive order from going into effect temporarily, citing possible violations of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Due process generally requires that a person is afforded an opportunity to be heard (for example, at a hearing before an impartial decision-maker) before they are deprived of a right. Equal protection requires that the government not treat people differently on the basis of race, ancestry, or religion.

David Cole, Legal Director for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), sees this executive order as essentially a Muslim-only ban on immigration which violates the Constitution’s Establishment Clause. While it doesn’t explicitly ban anyone on the basis of religion, the fact that it applies to seven Muslim-majority countries and creates, practically speaking, preferences for Christians, is enough to make it unconstitutional, Cole argues.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center and a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.

Legal Steps Sanctuary Cities Can Take If They Lose Federal Funding

The State and Local Legal Center’s Lisa Soronen discusses a few possible legal theories cities may rely on if they sue the federal government in the wake of President Trump’s most recent executive order.

(Getty Images)

New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio is threatening to sue the Trump administration in response to its most recent executive order, which calls for the removal of immigrants who (according to an immigration officer) are deemed to pose a risk to public safety. The order could theoretically pertain to any immigrant who has had any sort of interaction whatsoever with local law enforcement. (Getty Images)

On the campaign trail, President Donald Trump promised to cancel all federal funding to sanctuary cities who do not cooperate with the federal government in enforcing federal immigration law. True to his word, President Trump has signed an executive order stating that sanctuary cities are “not eligible to receive Federal grants,” with some unclear exceptions.

Whether and when this executive order will lead to cities losing federal funding, and how much, is unknown. New York City mayor Bill de Blasio has vowed to sue the federal government “the minute action to withhold funding” occurs.

Much has been written about what legal theories could be relied on to challenge the cancelling of federal funds. It is difficult to gauge the strength of these theories because all are rooted in Supreme Court precedent applying broad constitutional provisions in fact contexts different than this executive order.

Below are a few possible legal theories cities may rely on if they sue the federal government. The first three are based on limitation the Supreme Court has found in the Constitution’s Spending Clause. In short, the Spending Clause allows the federal government to place conditions on money states and local government receive – to a point. The final theory rests on the Tenth Amendment.

If sanctuary cities sue the federal government, they are likely to allege that cancelling all federal funding is “coercive” under the Spending Clause. In NFIB v. Sibelius (2012), Chief Justice Roberts famously described the federal government’s plan to withhold all Medicaid funding if states refused to agree to the Obamacare Medicaid expansion as a coercive “gun to the head.” In that case, states stood to lose more than 10 percent of their overall budget by not agreeing to the Medicaid expansion. Many sanctuary cities would stand to lose that percentage of their budget – and more – if they lost all federal dollars.

As George Mason University School of Law professor Illya Somin points out in a Washington Post article, the fact that the statutory language of most, if not all, federal grant programs to cities doesn’t require cities to assist the federal government with immigration enforcement is another possible ground for sanctuary cities to challenge this executive order. In decisions, including Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman (1981), the Supreme Court has stated that when Congress, using its spending power, imposes conditions on the receipt of federal funds it must do so “unambiguously.”

The Supreme Court also has held that per the Spending Clause conditions Congress place on grants must be “germane” or “related to” the federal interest in the grant program. In South Dakota v. Dole (1987), the Court noted approvingly that South Dakota didn’t challenge the “germaneness” of the Secretary of Transportation withholding a percent of highway funds to states which did not raise the drinking age to 21.

Now imagine if Congress “unambiguously” conditioned a number of federal grant programs for roads, health care, education, etc. on cities assisting with federal immigration enforcement. Cities could argue these conditions are not “germane” or “related to” the federal interests in funding roads, health care, or education.

The Tenth Amendment reserves powers not delegated to the federal government to the states. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Tenth Amendment to contain an anti-commandeering requirement where states and local governments cannot be required “to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” For example, in Printz v. United States (1997), the Court struck down a federal law requiring local police departments to perform handgun background checks until the federal government could manage the task. Sanctuary cities could therefore argue that they cannot be commandeered into enforcing federal immigration law.

lisa_soronen_new_125x150About the author: Lisa Soronen is the Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center and a regular contributor to CitiesSpeak.